What has Russia accomplished?
So, exactly what has Russia accomplished with its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine to this point? Has its invasion been a success in any way? How would Russia define (or re-define) success?
Outwardly, Putin’s goals of “liberating” Russian-speaking eastern parts of Ukraine, de-militarizing Ukraine, “de-Nazifying” the Ukrainian government, and of putting a check on NATO “expansion” have all been abject failures and this lack of success has actually weakened Putin domestically, although it is uncertain to what extent. These pronounced objectives are considered in turn.
However, there is much more to Putin’s (and Russia’s) motivation than that.
The real objective: Erasure of Ukrainian national identity
Russia’s objective was, and has been since the 17th century, simply to make and keep Ukraine an integral part of Russia, the way it was in either tsarist times (as a collection of imperial Russian provinces) or Soviet times (as a constituent USSR “republic”). This is for both political and economic reasons, since Ukrainian lands are resource-rich and geographically advantageous. From this perspective, neither the February 2022 full-scale invasion nor the February 2014 initial invasion (when Russia clandestinely occupied Crimea and sent its proxies to take over Ukraine’s eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk) are the true start of all this.
Although Vladimir Putin, who fancies himself a modern-day Peter the Great, initiated this last round of incursions, Russia has for generations had difficulty imagining itself without Ukraine as part of it in some way (“We are one people!” said Putin and so very many other Russians before him), so February 2022 is just the latest manifestation of that. Russians in general and Putin and his sycophants in particular, do not believe that Ukraine has the right to exist as a sovereign, independent country with the right to make its own decisions about its future, particularly a future that does not include Russia as the centre of its orbit. We must see everything else that we read or understand about this war through that lens. Russia simply wants to erase any manifestation of Ukrainian statehood or national identity.
First ostensible objective: "Liberate" Russian-speaking eastern parts of Ukraine
It did not take long for Russian invaders to find out that only a negligible number of Ukrainians wished to be “liberated” and felt even less affinity for their “fraternal” invaders as they watched the Russians slaughter civilians and spirit their housewares off to sell them in bazaars somewhere. Most Ukrainians on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River speak Russian as either a first or second language, and Putin tried to couch the invasion in terms of considering these Russian speakers as part of the “Russian World” and to which Russia therefore has a right of sovereign access. We may recall that Adolf Hitler used the same reasoning when Germany annexed Austria in the Anschluss of 1938.
Many Ukrainians on the left bank did at one time feel some affinity with Russians on the whole (for historical reasons that are beyond the scope of these articles), but this is most certainly no longer the case. There is no thought among Ukrainians of Russians “liberating” Russian-speaking eastern parts of Ukraine. Most Ukrainians there (and elsewhere) would now unquestionably welcome the sight of Vladimir Putin and his oligarchic henchmen (and henchwomen) swinging from a yardarm somewhere.
Second ostensible objective: De-militarize Ukraine
Ukraine's military
Russia claimed in February 2022, and has held the claim since, that one of its objectives is to de-militarize Ukraine. Russia says that it somehow feels “threatened” by a militarily robust Ukrainian state, knowing full well that this robustness would serve as a bulwark against Russian designs on Ukrainian territory. After Ukraine declared independence from the USSR in 1991, Ukraine’s military evolved essentially in a very stunted manner: its equipment, its hierarchy, and its approach were unsurprisingly very Soviet, i.e., tethered to Cold War rather than modern thinking. The substandard state of Ukrainian defence showed itself clearly in the ease with which Russia occupied Crimea and provided support to anti-Ukrainian “separatists” in the eastern oblasts (provinces) of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014.
However, Ukraine drew many military lessons from the events of that year. Although it was obviously limited in the extent to which it could modernize its equipment, it did become experienced and battle-hardened as a result of fighting in the east and it did change its command structure to give people in the field more on-site decision-making capabilities. This is in contrast to the Soviet model, in which the chain of command had to approve every decision – the new Ukrainian approach allowed for quicker responses to changing battlefield circumstances. Overall, the Ukrainian military in 2022 was not the Ukrainian military of 2014, as Russia soon discovered (and to which it has adapted, to some extent).
Who's next?
Then, of course, Europe as a whole and the other countries bordering Russia in particular (and who were either part of the Eastern bloc or constituent “republics” of the USSR) started seeing what Russia truly had in mind and began supplying weapons to Ukraine, knowing full well that, if Ukraine were to fall, they could well be Moscow’s next targets. Ukraine then went from being a military push-over to having a stronger military than ever, which is the diametric opposite of what Putin had desired. At the same time, Russia lost the best part of its own military, all of which changed the trajectory of the invasion in a very significant way.
Third ostensible objective: "De-Nazify" Ukraine
As for this malevolent idea of Russia wanting to “de-Nazify” Ukraine, this simply meant to liquidate any Ukrainians who do not feel an affinity to Russia, a line of thinking espoused, not only by political figures, but by the Russian Orthodox Church itself and its ex-KGB patriarch, the clownish but dangerous Kirill. Anti-Russian feeling has always been strongest in western Ukraine, and the Russians have had no problem in labelling this as fascism or “Russophobia” and reminding both its own people and the rest of the world that this is proof positive of Ukraine’s Nazi bona fides, nuance be damned. Interestingly, Russia conveniently seems to forget its own pact with Nazi Germany in 1939-41 in this textbook example of the Russian fascist pot calling the Ukrainian kettle black.
In terms of the February 2022 invasion, addressing this issue of Russia wanting to “de-Nazify” Ukraine meant, first and foremost, liquidating the duly elected Ukrainian government headed by President Volodymyr Zelensky. As we know, this did not happen, and it is exactly when Zelensky chose to stand his ground rather than attempt to govern from exile (“I need ammo, not a ride”) that the West, particularly the US, realized that supporting Ukraine in its fight might actually be a good idea. Zelensky, who is partly Jewish, not only endures, but has become semi-legendary throughout the world and a constant reminder of yet another Russian failure in the February 2022 full-scale invasion.
Fourth ostensible objective: Preventing NATO "expansion"
Preventing NATO “expansion” is another item on the list of what Russia supposedly wanted to accomplish with the invasion. This is Russian propagandistic nonsense because NATO is a defensive alliance that expands only when countries wish to join it. And why do they wish to join? Because Russia is a threat, now more than ever.
NATO was originally a 12-member alliance, with this number having grown to 31 (32, if Sweden is included) in the wake of the end of the Cold War and then later in the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia plays to its domestic audience by claiming that NATO is an existential threat to the Russian state. However, all but the wilfully blind are aware that, if Russia were not a threat, NATO would not be expanding as it has since February 2022, with Finland (who has a long mutual boundary with Russia and was once part of the Russian Empire) joining and Sweden wanting to join. Thus, if Putin’s goal was to limit NATO “expansion”, he has obviously been entirely unsuccessful in doing so.
Conclusion
So what has Russia accomplished? Based on Russia’s own stated objectives, its invasion of Ukraine has been a failure. First, Ukraine is more united and detached from the Russian sphere of influence than ever. Second, Ukraine is stronger militarily than it ever has been. Third, Russia has not effected regime change in Ukraine. Fourth, NATO includes more countries, including those that border Russia, than ever before. Russia’s maximalist goal of taking over all of Ukraine has been reduced (for now) to trying to keep those territories it has illegally occupied and that, too, hangs in the balance. Hundred of thousands have died on both sides, and for what, exactly? Putin’s perverted version of Russia’s role in the world and his part in it have come up woefully short and both Ukraine and much of the rest of the world are paying a terrible price for this malevolent, hubristic stupidity.
Next: The world’s response
Jerry, this is a very scholarly essay that is welcome to those of us whose knowledge of this obscene war consists of the 6 pm news cycle, and perhaps a newspaper editorial or two.
Continue to write, Jerry, for by doing so, you are providing a deepening understanding of a nightmare.
Thank you from the bottom of my heart, Don. Ukraine is quickly falling off of everyone’s radar and, if more people understood exactly what the Russians are doing in occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly with the kidnapping and brainwashing of children, they would be appalled. Not that the situation in Ukraine is the only thing going on in the world, but it’s no less critical in terms of both the immediate human cost and the security of the west than it was when it started.